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3
OF URANIUM AND CARBON: DIVERGENCE 





After the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, Chancellor Merkel of Germany an-
nounced a complete nuclear phase-out in Germany by 2022, while President Hollande of 
France assured the French government of his commitment to nuclear energy. Fossil fuels, 
notably lignite and coal, dominated the German energy sector with 47.9% market share of 
total energy production in Germany; nuclear energy is the leading energy source in France 
with a market share of 80.9% in 2013. The difference between natural resources’ abundance 
in Germany and France shaped the development of energy policy in both countries. Huge 
lignite and coal reserves in Germany continued to sustain Germany’s growing economy, 
while France, lacking fossil fuel deposits, pursued nuclear energy to gain economic and en-
ergy independence after the 1973 oil crisis. Anti-nuclear movement in Germany succeeded 
in mass mobilization and gained major political representation in both federal and state gov-
ernments through the Green Party and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The 
French anti-nuclear movement faced a strong centralized French government and failed to 
gain public support, and political isolation prevented any influence on French energy policy.
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Of Uranium and Carbon: Divergence of Energy Policy in Germany and France
 Energy has always been a crucial element of European politics, as Jean Monnet, one of 
the founding fathers of the European Union, once said, “coal and steel were at once the key 
to economic power and the raw materials for forging weapons of war” (Monnet, 1978, p. 
293). One of the main objectives of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 was to “ensure the supply of 
coal on equal terms inside a common market” through the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the predecessor of the European Union (Dedman, 
2010, p. 55). Since the early days of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Ger-
many and France, the two largest economies in the European Union, had shared a strategic 
and prosperous partnership. However, Germany and France have significantly diverged 
from each other in their respective energy policy. Germany has steadily harvested their rich 
coal and lignite resources even until today, while France feverishly adopted nuclear power 
for energy production since the enactment of Messmer Plan in 1974.  The paper examines 
the intriguing divergence in Germany and France’s current energy policy, and provides 
conclusive explanations for the policy divergence. The methodology employed to examine 
this issue consists of analyzing scholarly research and government publications, as well as 
looking at statistical data.
Dawn of nuclear energy in Germany and France
 Nazi Germany’s European war campaign during World War II has haunted post-war 
Germany, especially during the early years of reconstruction in the newly divided West 
Germany and East Germany. However, it is interesting to point out that anti-nuclear senti-
ment in Germany after World War II did not affect the early development stage of the nu-
clear energy industry in Germany. Initially, protests by anti-nuclear movements in Germany 
were only targeted against nuclear weapons. Schrafstetter (2004) noted that the successful 
West German peace movement Kampf dem Atomtod during the late 1950s was focused 
on “the deployment of US nuclear forces on West German soil” (p. 119). Furthermore, 
when the nuclear superpowers drafted a nuclear nonproliferation treaty in 1966, Willy 
Brandt, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) foreign minister at the time and future Ger-
man chancellor, welcomed the nonproliferation treaty but argued for “unrestrained use of 
civil nuclear energy” (Schrafstetter, 2004, p. 133–134). This supports the argument that the 
government of West Germany was committed to Chancellor Adenauer’s promise in 1954 
on the renunciation of nuclear weapon development in West Germany, but not extended 
to the development of civil nuclear energy. The first nuclear power plant in Germany, the 
Obrigheim Nuclear Power Plant, started its operation in 1969 as one of the energy sources 
of a diverse German energy industry.
 While Germany had adopted nuclear energy as early as 1969 and gradually addedmore 
nuclear power plants throughout the years, France only massively adopted nuclear energy 
after the announcement of Messmer Plan by French Prime Minister Pierre Messmer in 
1974. Under the Messmer Plan, France targeted to increase nuclear energy production to 
85% by 2000, and 170 light water nuclear reactors would be installed across 40 sites (Topçu, 
2008, p. 228). The Messmer Plan is an “ambitious nuclear program,” planned in reaction 
to the 1973 oil crisis, and the French government promoted nuclear energy as the only 
solution for an independent French energy sector (Topçu, 2008, p. 228). As a result of the 
Messmer Plan, 56 nuclear power plants is installed in France within 15 years (Palfreman, 
1997).
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Supply Chain for Uranium and Fossil Fuels in Germany and France
 Even though the success of the anti-nuclear movement in Germany is largely credited 
tothe  mass mobilization and strength of political allies, economic factors also strongly influ-
ence the energy policy planned by the German and French governments. The supply for 
both fossil fuels and uranium is a major factor determining the energy choice of both Ger-
many and France. Both Germany and France are highly dependent on foreign oil imports, 
with Germany having a 98% import dependency (International Energy Agency, 2012a) 
and France having almost 100% import dependency (International Energy Agency, 2012b). 
Therefore, both petroleum and natural gas power stations are not primary choices for en-
ergy production in both Germany and France, as the energy price would be affected by 
global oil and gas supply shock. As a result, only about 1.1% of energy in France is produced 
by oil and gas, and only 10.5% of energy in Germany is produced by oil and gas (Eurostat, 
2015). The slightly higher percentage of oil and gas energy production in Germany could be 
explained by Germany’s wider network of oil and gas suppliers. Crude oil is imported into 
France through three main seaports, with 43% of imports originating from Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), notably Libya and Saudi Arabia (International 
Energy Agency, 2012a). Meanwhile, Germany has four cross-border pipelines and four 
main seaports supplying crude oil into Germany, with 50.8% of imports originating from 
former USSR countries, notably Russia (International Energy Agency, 2012b).
 Even though both Germany and France lack major oil and gas deposit, Germany has 
a huge coal and lignite deposit compared to France. According to data released by the Eu-
ropean Association for Coal and Lignite, Germany has 40.4 gigatons of lignite reserves and 
2.50 gigatons of hard coal reserves, while France has nearly zero reserves of coal and lignite 
(2014). Furthermore, the European Association for Coal and Lignite points out that the 
low calorific value of lignite makes transport uneconomic over longer distances, and lignite 
power plants are commonly built adjacent to lignite mines (2015). Therefore, Germany 
benefits from its huge lignite and coal reserves, as seen in lignite’s 37.4% contribution to the 
total energy production in Germany (Eurostat, 2015). This also explains why France can’t 
benefit from Germany’s huge deposit of lignite even though they are neighboring countries, 
as it would not be cost effective to transport lignite over long distances. Germany’s huge 
natural reserves of lignite and coal have made it logical for Germany to adopt energy policy 
friendly towards lignite- and coal-powered energy production.
 Similar to their oil and gas supplies, both Germany and France also rely on foreign 
imports of uranium for their nuclear power plants, as uranium mines in both Germany and 
France are either closed or depleted (World Nuclear Association, 2014). Uranium mines in 
Germany are mostly located in regions of former East Germany, and much of it was deplet-
ed in the Soviet’s nuclear weapons program and nuclear energy production in Eastern Eu-
rope (World Nuclear Association, 2014). On the other hand, France has a fully developed 
fuel cycle strategy for its entire uranium supply chain, with significant overseas investment 
in exploration and mine development in key producing countries such as Canada, Niger, 
and Namibia (International Energy Agency, 2009). Niger, a former French colony, con-
tributed 5% to global uranium production in 2007 (International Atomic Energy Agency, 
2009) and supplied 32% of France’s uranium demand (World Nuclear Association, 2015). 
Furthermore, France had developed technology for recycling uranium from used nuclear 
fuel, and it is estimated that about 17% of nuclear energy production in France is produced 
from recycled uranium (World Nuclear Association).
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Mass mobilization and Anti-Nuclear Movements in Germany and France
 Blowers and Lowry (1997) argue that environmental and safety concerns, especially 
“the rear end of the nuclear cycle, reprocessing and waste management” were the main mo-
tives for the rise of the anti-nuclear energy movement in Germany starting from the 1970s 
(p. 150). Arnold (2015) also argues that the disposal of reprocessed nuclear waste is a criti-
cal problem that “will last for centuries” and unpredictable factors such as “natural disaster, 
terrorism, and catastrophic human error” could be harmful to both the environment and 
human health (p. 26). Blowers and Lowry (1997) note that “the anti-nuclear movement 
has already contributed to the abandonment of reprocessing in Germany” (p. 154). Public 
discontent forced Germany to export its spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing in France and 
the United Kingdom; a process which has led to an increase in the operating cost of German 
nuclear power plants (Blowers & Lowry, 1997, p. 151). Blowers and Lowry further explain 
that nuclear energy is “expensive and alternative sources of electricity, notably gas, are read-
ily available” (p. 152). The increase in operating cost caused by the mandatory export of 
nuclear waste for reprocessing has made the German nuclear energy industry unattractive 
compared to other energy options.
 Nuclear disasters such as Chernobyl and Fukushima, even though they occurred out-
side of Germany, strongly motivated the anti-nuclear movement in Germany and created 
national consensus to phase out nuclear energy. Stefes (2010) explains that “the Chernobyl 
disaster in 1986 empowered the anti-nuclear movement, and a vast majority of Germans 
advocated phasing out nuclear energy” (p. 154). Traditionally, the conservative CDU-CSU 
alliance had supported nuclear energy, while SPD preferred a phase out of nuclear energy 
in Germany (Blowers & Lowry, 1997, p. 152). Stefes notes SPD–the Green coalition’s suc-
cessful negotiation with German power utilities to phase out nuclear power plants (p. 159). 
Shim, Park, and Wilding (2015) note that in 1998, the SPD-Green coalition government 
had proposed the phase out of nuclear energy in Germany by 2022; however, in 2009, 
Chancellor Merkel from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) announced a 12-year 
delay. The federal government argued, “the phaseout would present huge challenges for the 
national economy and industrial structure,” and nuclear power would remain as a “bridg-
ing technology” to the future (Shim et al., 2015, p. 54). Huß (2014) further shows that the 
proposed extension of nuclear power plant operations in Germany is not a popular political 
move as “roughly half of the electorate opposed nuclear power” (p. 432).
 While the anti-nuclear movement gained momentum in Germany, the French anti-
nuclear movement suffered from a lack of public support. Koopmans and Duyvendak (1995) 
point out that even after the Chernobyl nuclear accident, there was only a slight increase in 
anti-nuclear protests in France, while there was a significant increase in anti-nuclear protests 
in Germany (p. 238). Koopmans and Duyvendak further argue that the anti-nuclear move-
ment in France had been marginalized due to three major factors: discourse that underlined 
the safety of the French nuclear industry, nuclear energy as a guarantee of energy indepen-
dence, and the nuclear industry as a source of national grandeur (p. 243). This argument is 
also supported by Litmanen (1998), who explains  that civil society in France is not very 
developed, and the state had promoted nuclear technological expertise since the beginning 
(p. 9). Schneider (2013) points to a survey conducted in 2012 after Germany’s exit from 
nuclear energy that showed that 64% of the French population agreed that nuclear energy 
should remain the main source of energy production in France (p. 30). Schneider also ex-
plains that the anti-nuclear movement in France is comprised mostly of scientists and envi-
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ronmentalists, unlike the massive anti-nuclear movement in Germany that has widespread 
public support (p. 32). 
Federal Germany vs. Centralized France
 Germany as a country with a federal government system has delegated a lot of its policy 
implementation power to the Länder, or state governments. Thus, the pro-nuclear energy 
CDU federal government cannot fully adopt nuclear energy in Germany as state govern-
ments could oppose the federal government’s nuclear project through their policy-imple-
mentation power. One of the problems the German nuclear industry faces as a result of the 
federal and state government power struggle in Germany is the lack of storage facilities for 
processed nuclear waste. Even though the German government has yielded to public opin-
ions and exported its nuclear waste for reprocessing in France and the United Kingdom, 
the federal government still faced the problem of finding suitable locations for the storage 
of reprocessed nuclear waste returned from France and the United Kingdom. Blowers and 
Lowry (1997) point out that anti-nuclear energy politicians in the Lower Saxony state gov-
ernment had rejected the federal government’s proposal to set up long-term nuclear-waste 
storage facilities in Lower Saxony through “its regulatory and licensing powers” (p. 152). 
Blowers and Lowry point out that the lack of long-term nuclear storage facilities in Ger-
many challenges the future of the nuclear energy industry in Germany, and thus forces the 
federal government to revise its energy policy (p. 154).
 The nuclear industry's weak political representation was a further challenge to Ger-
man's development of nuclear energy. In many advanced industrialized countries such as 
France and the United States, lobbyists representing nuclear-energy interest groups are vital 
in securing politicians’ support for the development of nuclear energy. Blowers and Lowry 
(1997) note that the nuclear industry in Germany is weak politically and lacks a strong rep-
resentation by interest group (p. 154). Moreover, Blowers and Lowry (1997) also point out 
that the German nuclear industry did not have a strong dependent local workforce, thus 
weakening their position when negotiating with national political parties and environmental 
groups (p. 154). Blowers and Lowry further supported this argument by saying, “political 
circumstances are propitious for an anti-nuclear movement as determined as that in Germa-
ny” (p. 154).The failure of the German nuclear energy industry to ensure a strong political 
representation in both federal and local governments has crippled the development of Ger-
man nuclear energy potential. This is further worsened by the strong policy implementation 
powers of local governments compared to the federal government; state governments can 
effectively shut down federally proposed nuclear energy projects through “its regulatory 
and licensing powers” (Blowers & Lowry, 1997, p. 152). Without cooperation from state 
governments, the German nuclear energy industry cannot expand its operation even with 
support from ministers and politicians at the federal level.
 The semi-presidential system in France ensures a strong, centralized government in 
Paris, unlike the German federal government in Berlin. The French government has heav-
ily supported the nuclear energy industry in France since the Messmer Plan in 1974 and 
the bureaucratic strength of a centralized French government helped the nuclear industry 
to prosper. Delmas and Heiman (2001) argue that “the impermeability of the institutional 
setup (no division of power, weak judiciary, and strong bureaucracy)” in France “effectively 
prevented activists from influencing policy outcomes” (p. 436). Litmanen (1998) further 
supports this argument; as he explains, “French political opportunity structure is closed” 
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and “access to political decision-making is limited” (p. 9). Delmas and Heiman also point 
out that the Ministry in France is responsible for the implementation of government policy 
and party discipline is strong across government ministry (p. 439). Therefore, the nuclear 
industry in France never faced the kind of resistance than it did in Germany where state 
governments can refuse to implement federal policy.
Political Representation of Environmentalists and its Success
 The anti-nuclear movement in Germany is represented by the Green Party but has also 
gained support from SPD party members. The German Green Party had previously formed 
a coalition government with SPD under Chancellor Schroder, and in 1998 successfully 
pushed for a nuclear phase-out by 2020 (Shim et al, 2015, p.54). Even though in 2009 the 
CDU government announced a 12-year delay for nuclear phase out in Germany, the Green 
Party as an opposition party in Germany provided constant electoral pressure on CDU. 
After the Fukushima nuclear accident, public opinion swayed towards nuclear phase-out in 
Germany and therefore increased the political strength of the Green Party. The study con-
ducted by Shim et al. notes that after the Fukushima nuclear accident, the German federal 
government did try to negate nuclear energy’s negative publicity in Germany by framing 
nuclear-energy policy as clean energy (p. 71). However, the German federal government 
was ultimately persuaded by the growing national consensus that “the time ha[d] come to 
phase out nuclear energy and to invest in renewable energy technologies” (Shim et al., 
2015, p. 71). Struntz (2014) further supports this argument; he notes, “while the energy 
transformation occurs on a timescale of decades, the Fukushima-shock and the ensuing Ger-
man energy policy consensus in 2011 constitute a sudden regime shift” (p. 157). 
 Huß (2014) also notes that the rising anti-nuclear national consensus after the Fuku-
shima nuclear disaster was very strong, and Chancellor Merkel announced the rapid nuclear 
phase-out while disregarding “objections from their parties and ministries as well as possible 
legal problems” (p. 434). Zohlnhöfer and Engler (2014) further explain that “nuclear en-
ergy became the second most urgent problem in Germany in 2011,” and it posed a serious 
electoral threat to the CDU-CSU and FDP coalitions that had previously supported the 
extension of nuclear energy in Germany (p. 297). Zohlnhöfer and Engler (2014) also argued 
that Chancellor Merkel’s rapid announcement of nuclear phase out is a political strategy to 
“limit the negative electoral effects of their previous policy” (p. 299). In short, the Green 
Party had built up its political strength in Germany and Chancellor Merkel was forced to 
announce nuclear phase-out in Germany to avoid electoral defeat to the Green Party.
 Unlike in Germany, the anti-nuclear movement in France lacked political representa-
tion by a strong political party like German’s Green Party and was thus unable to influence 
nuclear policy. Litmanen (1998) argues that the French anti-nuclear movement lacked allies 
among French political parties (p. 9). He also notes that the French anti-nuclear movement 
failed to gain support from the Socialist Party in France, and the anti-nuclear movement 
waspolitically isolated when the Socialist Party came to power in the 1980s (p. 10-11). 
According to Koopmans and Duyvendak, the Socialist Party abandoned the anti-nuclear 
movement and continued the nuclear energy program, causing most members of the French 
anti-nuclear movement to give up their struggle (p. 246). Without a strong political party 
to represent them at the national level, the French anti-nuclear movement ultimately failed 
to influence French nuclear policy.
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Future of Energy Policy in Germany and France
 As both the largest economy and largest energy user in the European Union, Germany 
has risen to a leadership position in the European Union. However, Germany’s rapid phase 
out of nuclear energy after the Fukushima nuclear accident may create future obstacles 
with its EU partners. Röhrkasten and Westphal (2012) note that Germany’s decision for a 
rapid nuclear phase out and operation termination of its eight nuclear plants, without prior 
consultation with the EU and its neighboring countries, could create “a new thread of 
conflict to its European energy relations” (p. 332). Röhrkasten and Westphal explain that 
Germany’s neighbors “felt sidelined by the speedy political decisions,” especially when the 
Union is moving towards a common, European energy policy under the European Energy 
Union (p. 332). The European Commission (2015) specified its priorities under the Euro-
pean Energy Union to ensure “secure, affordable and sustainable” energy for the European 
Union. 
 France and the United Kingdom are strong advocates for nuclear energy in the Euro-
pean Union. France has “the most refined and extensive nuclear energy programs, with a 
high degree of energy security and the lowest energy cost in the European Union” (Shim 
et al., 2015, p. 54), while the United Kingdom also “sees itself as at the forefront of the 
‘nuclear renaissance’” (p. 55). Ferguson (2010) also points out that France and its state-
owned nuclear company Avera had been busy advocating nuclear energy overseas, espe-
cially in the Arab world (p. 92). Meanwhile, Feldhoff (2014) notes that the high-cost nature 
of renewable energy has caused “growing pain” in the German economy, especially since 
the rapid phase out of nuclear energy followed by expansion of renewable energy (p. 92). 
He/she further explains that energy-intensive German companies received exemption from 
the renewable-energy surcharge to maintain its competitiveness, especially against cheaper 
nuclear energy, and the EU is launching inquiries into this exemption as a violation of  the 
European Union’s free market. Nonetheless, as Feldhoff brilliantly points out, “a return 
to nuclear energy is now beyond any political imagination” and the German government 
should be dedicated to the development of renewable energy in Germany (p. 91, 95).
 
Author's note
 This paper was prepared for the 13th Annual Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research 
Conference on the European Union.
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